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To Recognize the Tyranny of Distance:
A Spatial Reading of Whole Woman’s Health v.
Hellerstedt
© Michele Statz* & Lisa R. Pruitt** 2017
Abstract 
Distance—physical, material distance—is an obviously spatial concept, 
but one rarely engaged by legal or feminist geographers.  We take up this 
oversight in relation to the 2016 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Whole 
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, which adjudicated the constitutionality of a 
Texas law that imposed new regulations on abortion providers.  Because half
of the state’s abortion providers were unable to meet these regulations and 
thus closed, the distance that many Texas women had to travel for abortion 
services increased dramatically.  In part because of these increases, the 
Supreme Court ultimately determined that the Texas laws imposed an 
unconstitutional “undue burden.” 
Bringing together case law and ethnographic data, this article traces 
the process by which distance is made legally “legible” in the context of 
reproductive in/justice. In so doing, it confronts more uneasy realities of 
distance, including the discursive dismissal of social and literal im/mobility 
and isolation; contradictory readings of “emptiness”; and the material 
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spatiality of distance through the non/place-ness of rural areas. Together, 
these factors illuminate a more significant distance, namely the epistemic 
and social distance that exists between the legal performance of distance in 
litigation and the embodied traversal of distance by a woman seeking an 
abortion in Texas.  Prioritizing rural distance as material, legal and gendered,
our work engages and augments the nascent field of feminist legal 
geographies. It likewise challenges legal geographers’ insistence on urban 
space by uncovering the ways in which even the relative “emptiness” of 
distance is intimately consequential.
Finally, this paper makes connections between the exercise of the 
abortion right and the exercise of other rights that implicate distance, most 
notably the right to vote.  Just as abortion regulations have often had the 
effect of requiring women to travel farther for abortion services, voter ID 
laws have the effect of requiring voters to travel to a public agency in order 
to secure the requisite identity document.  Other voting regulations and 
state and local voting practices may similarly impose spatial burdens on 
voters.  We thus assert that what Whole Woman’s Health reveals about 
making distance legally cognizable finds ready legal application in other 
contexts.  
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Introduction
In June, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the most significant 
abortion case in nearly a quarter century, Whole Woman’s Health v. 
Hellerstedt. In a 5-3 decision, the Court invalidated as unconstitutional two 
Texas TRAP laws (Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers) passed in 2013 
as part of Texas House Bill 2 (H.B. 2).  These regulations required initially 
that abortion providers have admitting privileges at a hospital within 30 
miles of the clinic where abortions are performed, and secondly that abortion
clinics meet the extensive and expensive requirements of Ambulatory 
Surgical Centers (ASC).1  
While the stated purpose of these TRAP laws was to protect women’s 
health, critics quickly identified this justification as pretextual, and the U.S. 
Supreme Court ultimately agreed.  Also widely recognized was the fact that 
compliance with the requirements would put many providers out of business 
and significantly increase the cost of abortion services (Greenhouse and 
Siegel, 2016).  Indeed, when the federal court of appeals initially upheld the 
Texas admitting privileges requirement in 2014, more than half of the state’s
44 abortion providers were unable to comply and forced to close.  This left 
vast areas of the state without access to abortion services.  If the ASC 
1 The ASC requirements included, among others, halls wide enough for two gurneys side by 
side; a full surgical suite with 240 square feet or more of clear floor area in the operating 
room; a minimum of 14 feet between built-in cabinets, counters, and shelves; and specific 
plumbing and heating and cooling system requirements (Whole Woman’s Health, 2016:  
2314).
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requirement had gone into effect, the shortage of providers would have 
become significantly more dire, their spatial concentration more dramatic.  
The Supreme Court decision prevented that outcome.  
From a legal geography standpoint, Whole Woman’s Health is 
significant because of the Supreme Court’s unprecedented attention to 
spatiality, specifically to the burden of distance.  This case reflects what we 
identify as a compelling trend: the increasing significance of distance—
including distance as a feature of rural life—in litigation regarding the 
exercise of rights.  As we demonstrate here, this judicial recognition of 
distance as a barrier or burden is worth exploring in and beyond the 
particular context of Whole Woman’s Health.  We argue that the obstacle of 
distance, which is not unique to this case or to abortion regulations more 
generally, implicates more intricate and often “invisible” realities of gender, 
poverty, rurality, and immigration status, as well as the intersections among 
these. By grappling with distance in this way, our work contributes to 
feminist legal geography’s understanding of rural spatiality and distance, 
reproductive justice, and sociospatial and legal im/mobility and in/visibility.  
It thus also contributes to our understanding of an array of power relations.
In what follows, we introduce our conceptual and methodological 
approach to distance.  We then present a brief history of abortion law in the 
United States, with a focus on the themes of distance and travel.  This is a 
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prelude to our overview of the Whole Woman’s Health litigation.  We next 
sketch as theoretical frames the feminist literatures on abortion law and 
political geography, as well as the legal geography scholarship.  We 
additionally consider how—or if—these and other interdisciplinary literatures 
recognize rural distance, as well as and corollary concepts including 
emptiness, im/mobility and embodiment.  We then return to a more 
substantive analysis of the Supreme Court’s decision, tracing throughout the 
role of distance in legal and ethnographic interpretations of Whole Woman’s 
Health.  We also explore how distance became a gateway for surfacing other 
characteristics and vulnerabilities. Finally, we conclude by summarizing the 
contributions this study makes to feminist legal geography, as well as the 
ways in which a more nuanced understanding of rural distance will advance 
theoretical and applied work amidst new threats to constitutional rights. 
Distance and Method: Reading Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt
Among human geographers, distance is variously viewed as a 
“remnant” of the discipline’s positivistic days (Johnston 2009: 169); as 
rendered “dead” through global communications and information technology
(Cairncross, 1997; Grimes, 1999; Halfacree, 1993; Kolko, 2000); as nominally
if at all related to subjective experiences of place (Cresswell, 2014); or 
important insomuch as it situates an individual’s or movement’s “location” 
(Capling and Nossal 2001).  Rather than dismiss distance as outmoded or 
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peripheral, we instead posit it as a timely and compelling locus for social, 
spatial, and legal experience.  Indeed, we suggest that distance ought to be 
brought “into the theoretical foreground” (Young, 2006: 254) in some spatial 
analyses.  
We thus affirm Dragos Simandan’s call to attend to “the rich concept of
distance” (2016: 251) and extend it to the context of feminist legal 
geography.  Through a critical legal and ethnographic reading of distance in 
Whole Woman’s Health, we demonstrate the ways in which distance aptly 
illuminates—and quite literally spans—embodied, performed, discursive and 
quantified understandings of law and space.  In this way, we not only surface
the persistent and multi-faceted “tyranny of distance” (Blainey, 1968), but 
also establish distance as a particularly dynamic lens through which to view 
both the topological and relational workings of law.
To meaningfully engage so many interpretations of distance, we offer a
necessarily multidisciplinary methodology. In light of what Laura Nader calls 
the “contemporary cacophony” in law and society scholarship, we firmly 
acknowledge that legal scholars and social scientists do different things: “We
have much to learn from each other, but if we try to do each other’s work, 
the work suffers from our naiveté and inexperience” (2002: 73). Rather than 
encourage legal geographers to reflexively (but we fear uncritically or 
inadequately) borrow the methods of other disciplines ad hoc (Braverman, 
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2014), we believe that rich concepts and complex cases demand rigorous 
multidisciplinary engagement.  This analysis accordingly weaves together 
Michele Statz’s approach as an anthropologist of law and Lisa Pruitt’s 
perspective as a scholar of law and rural livelihoods, as well as feminist legal 
theory.2 
Our bringing together distinct and at times disparate methods and 
perspectives to engage with distance is deliberate.  As our data 
demonstrate, Whole Woman’s Health exemplifies the timely yet still 
amorphous space of “feminist legal geography”: Depending on one’s 
location, the case is about women’s rights, human rights, or states’ rights.  It 
is about reproductive rights or reproductive justice; it is political and moral; it
is procedural; it involves empathy and autonomy, mobility and 
infrastructure; it is powerfully entangled with legal status, language, 
ethnicity and class.  
The data we explore include pleadings and briefs the parties filed at 
each stage of the Whole Woman’s Health litigation.  We also compiled and 
analyzed media accounts of the case.  Finally, in August 2016, Michele Statz 
traveled to New York to conduct semi-structured interviews with six of the 
2 Of course, we recognize that legal scholars and ethnographers actually do some things 
similarly.  Both practices interpret and prioritize among competing accounts, and they make 
visible just as they contain power-filled spaces and omissions.  When done well, each 
instantiates a reality that was there all along (Yngvesson and Coutin 2008; see also Riles 
1994).
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attorneys who litigated the case.3  In these conversations, the lawyers  
discussed case development and strategy, while also initiating broader 
questions of reproductive rights and justice, professional motivation, and 
political mobilization.  We attribute their candor to Statz’s training and 
experience as a qualitative researcher, as well as to her forthright admission 
of not having a Juris Doctorate (law degree).  Had Pruitt conducted these 
interviews, we suspect our data would be more focused on legal 
technicalities and procedure, and that the interviews might have been 
influenced by Pruitt’s past legal scholarship on rural women’s abortion 
access.  
Holding the ethnographic data Statz collected against Pruitt’s analysis 
of litigation documents and judicial opinions illuminates critical junctures 
each of us likely would have overlooked on our own.  In these junctures, 
many of our initial questions proved inconsequential.  Other details, like the 
quantification of distance, emerged as not only legally significant but also as 
profoundly intimate and indicative of the intricacies and intersections of 
gender, poverty, immigration status, and even seemingly mundane factors 
such as public transit infrastructure. 
3 Three of these individuals, including Stephanie Toti, who ultimately argued the case before 
the U.S. Supreme Court, continue to work at the Center for Reproductive Rights.  Two others
now work for different advocacy organizations, and a third served on the case pro bono. To 
maintain confidentiality, we use pseudonyms and do not link interview excerpts with 
attorneys’ affiliated organizations. 
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Putting Whole Woman’s Health in Legal Context
In the U.S. legal system, challenges to the constitutionality of a law are
initially made in federal district court, a trial court in which both parties 
proffer evidence to support their claims.  The defendant in such cases is the 
state that enacted the law, though the named defendant may be a state 
official; in Whole Woman’s Health, the defendant, Hellerstedt, was 
Commissioner of the Texas Department of Health Services.4  Following an 
initial ruling, the losing party may appeal to a U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
relevant region.  In Whole Woman’s Health, that appeal was to the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which includes the states of Texas, Louisiana 
and Mississippi.  There is no appeal as a matter of right from a U.S. Court of 
Appeal; rather, the U.S. Supreme Court has discretion to choose which cases 
it will hear.  The Court likely agreed to consider Whole Woman’s Health 
because of a circuit split—that is, differing rulings among federal courts of 
appeal—regarding the constitutionality of TRAP regulations similar to those 
in Texas (Petition for a Writ of Certiorari in Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole: 
15-20 (2015)). The Supreme Court’s decision in Whole Woman’s Health 
resolved that circuit split, making abortion regulation more uniform across 
the United States.  
Texas abortion providers challenged the TRAP regulations in H.B. 2 in 
4 When the case was before the federal district court, the defendant was Lakey, and in the 
Fifth Circuit the defendant was Cole, the two predecessors to Hellerstedt.
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consecutive lawsuits.  In the first case, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
upheld the constitutionality of the admitting privileges requirement (Planned 
Parenthood v. Abbott, 2014).  Because many Texas abortion providers were 
not able to secure admitting privileges, more than half of Texas’ abortion 
clinics closed.  Most of the clinics forced to close were in small- and mid-
sized cities, including in the Rio Grande Valley (RGV) and in sparsely 
populated West Texas, thus leaving women in those regions particularly 
poorly served. 
At stake in the constitutional challenge to the second requirement was 
a further dramatic reduction in abortion availability in Texas.  If the ASC 
requirement were upheld—as it initially was by the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals—the number of abortion providers in Texas would have fallen to just
six or seven to serve the state’s 5.4 million reproductive age women (Whole 
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 2016: 2301). Moreover, all remaining 
providers would have been located in four major metropolitan areas in the 
eastern and northern parts of the state: Dallas-Fort Worth, Austin, San 
Antonio, and Houston. Massive parts of Texas—the second largest in both 
population and land area among U.S. states (U.S. Census Bureau)—would 
have been left without abortion services.  
Spatiality and distance were differently understood, alternatively 
foregrounded or dismissed, as the Whole Woman’s Health case rose through 
10
© Michele Statz & Lisa R. Pruitt 2017
Working Paper 
August 14, 2017
 
the courts.  The spatial implications of the Texas law were readily apparent 
and easily accommodated by the relevant legal test:  Did the Texas law 
impose an “undue burden” on the right to an abortion? At trial, the Center 
for Reproductive Rights, as plaintiffs’ counsel, laid a strong factual 
foundation regarding spatiality, including both qualitative and quantitative 
evidence of distance, which we discuss further below.  The trial court 
decision, for example, led with details of Texas’ size, “nearly 280,000 square 
miles [and] ten percent larger than France.” (Whole Woman’s Health v. 
Lakey, 2014: 681).  The plaintiffs’ Supreme Court briefs featured a map 
showing the location of abortion providers, indicating those that had closed 
as a consequence of the admitting privileges requirement, as well as those 
that would close if the ASC requirement were upheld. 
Yet not all judges who heard the case as it worked its way to the 
Supreme Court comprehended or credited the burden of distance.  During 
one oral argument before the U.S. Court of Appeals about the admitting 
privilege requirement, Judge Edith Jones downplayed the burden of distance, 
asking, “Do you know how long [driving 150-miles, the distance between the 
RGV and the nearest abortion provider in Corpus Christi] takes in Texas at 75
miles per hour? And this is a peculiarly flat and not congested highway.”  
Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, on the other hand, commented 
during oral argument that Texas H.B. 2 was not a problem for women “who 
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have the means to travel” or for “those who live in Austin or Dallas—but the 
women who have the problem [are those] who don’t live near a clinic.”  
Ginsburg thus focused on the burden of travel, recognizing the 
fundamentally different positions of women who live near a provider or who 
can afford to travel a long distance, as compared to those living far from a 
clinic, especially if they are low income.       
Ginsburg’s question surely reflects the plaintiffs’ litigation strategy, 
which focused on the travails of women in the Rio Grande Valley, where the 
admitting privileges requirement had already closed the area’s only two 
clinics, in McAllen and Harlingen. As a result, RGV women had to travel at 
least 235 miles each way to a provider in San Antonio for abortion services.  
One attorney described what that journey was like:
…[T]here are a lot of communities in the [Rio Grande] Valley that don’t
have paved roads.  There are some public buses, but the public buses 
don’t reach all of the places where people live [or] go all the way to San
Antonio… If you can get to McAllen or Brownsville, one of the urban 
centers in the Valley, then you can get a commercial bus to take you to
San Antonio, but you have to get there at 4:00 in the morning and you 
have to change twice, and then you can’t—there’s no bus 
that’s going to get you back [to the RGV the same day] after your 
appointment, which is going to take several hours. 
Although 90% of RGV residents are Latino, and the poverty rate for that area
is a staggering 38% (U.S. Census Bureau), the plaintiffs’ brief did not include 
those data points.  It did, however, note that “the region is largely rural and 
a substantial percentage of its residents are poor,” with an average median 
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income $19,000 below the state average (Plaintiffs’ Trial Brief, Whole 
Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 2014: 29).  Plaintiffs’ pleadings focused 
secondarily on women in West Texas, as the ASC requirement threatened 
closure of the sole remaining abortion provider in El Paso.  If that clinic 
closed, West Texas women would have to travel as far as 550 miles one-way 
to San Antonio, also the location of their nearest in-state provider (Whole 
Woman’s Health v. Cole 2015: 596).5 
To understand the significance of Whole Woman’s Health’s attention to
distance, it is helpful to situate it in the context of prior cases.  The Supreme 
Court recognized the right to an abortion in its 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade.
Prior to that ruling, some states permitted abortion and others did not, 
resulting in an uneven patchwork of abortion availability that required many 
women to travel significant distances for abortion services (Greenhouse and 
Siegel, 2012).6  The Roe Court relied on a constitutional right to privacy in 
holding that states could not make laws that criminalized abortion.  The 
Court also clarified that some state regulation of abortion was permissible, 
5 An abortion provider was available across the state line in New Mexico.  However, the Fifth 
Circuit had previously held that for the purposes of applying the undue burden analysis, a 
court may only consider the effect a law will have within the regulating state and not the 
availability of abortion services in neighboring states (Jackson Women’s Health v. Currier, 
2015: 457-58).
6 The same was and is true in Canada.  Prior to the Canadian Supreme Court’s 1988 decision
in R. v. Morgentaler, abortion was illegal unless approved by a hospital’s Therapeutic 
Abortion Committee (Palmer, 2011).  Many women traveled across Canada and to the United
States prior to Morgentaler, and abortion availability is still uneven in Canada, causing many
women still to travel great distances for the service (Sethna and Douell, 2013).  The issue of 
cross-border travel for abortion still arises in countries like Ireland, where abortion remains 
illegal, causing women to travel to the United Kingdom for the procedure (Sethna et al., 
2013: 30).
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less at the outset of a pregnancy when a woman’s right clearly outweighed 
that of a non-viable fetus, more later in the pregnancy. 
In the wake of Roe, many states passed laws regulating abortion, 
testing what would be constitutionally permissible.  One of the most common
types of regulations required that women wait between 24 and 72 hours 
after an initial consultation with an abortion provider before she could have 
the procedure, a wait intended to compel her to reflect on the choice and 
thus to ensure her “informed consent” (“waiting period” or “informed 
consent” laws).  The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania passed a law that 
included such a waiting period among other regulations, and in 1992, the 
U.S. Supreme Court considered the law’s constitutionality in Planned 
Parenthood of SE Pennsylvania v. Casey.  The Supreme Court in Casey 
articulated a new test for government regulation of abortion: whether a law 
constituted an “undue burden” on the right to terminate a pregnancy. 
The Casey Court concluded that the waiting period/informed consent 
provision did not constitute an undue burden, even as it recognized that the 
law imposed the added cost and inconvenience of an overnight stay or two 
separate journeys for those living some distance from a provider.  The Court 
characterized as “troubling in some respects” the trial court’s finding that 
“for those women with the fewest financial resources, those who must travel 
long distances, and those who have difficulty explaining their whereabouts to
14
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husbands, employers, or others, the 24-hour waiting period will be 
‘particularly burdensome’” (Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 1992: 2825).  Nevertheless, the Court did not view 
the burden as sufficient to invalidate the law.7  
In the wake of Casey, pro-choice groups brought challenges to many 
states’ waiting period/informed consent laws.  Yet no federal court of appeals
ever recognized distance or travel as constituting the entirety or even some 
component of an “undue burden” (Pruitt, 2007).  This changed only with the 
U.S. Supreme Court decision in Whole Woman’s Health.
The Whole Woman’s Health plaintiffs’ strategy for making distance 
legally cognizable is compelling in its own right, and as we demonstrate 
below, other considerations that facilitated that strategy are worth 
examining.  What kind of knowledge—and whose—did this strategy deploy?  
How did attorneys professionally and also personally evaluate it?  To what 
extent was it recognized or neglected by the courts? To answer these 
questions is to meaningfully situate Whole Woman’s Health in feminist 
political geography scholarship on knowledge and knowledge claims, and to 
likewise demonstrate both the case’s immediate and more theoretical 
implications. 
7 The Casey court did, however, strike as unconstitutional a provision of the Pennsylvania 
law that required married women to notify their husbands before they could get an abortion.
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Making (Rural) Distance Matter
In this section, we underscore distance—in particular, distance as a 
feature of rural life—as a critical but often neglected concept with 
implications for both feminist and legal strands of geographies scholarship. 
To do so, we first briefly introduce the feminist legal studies literature about 
abortion law.  We next turn to feminist political geographies scholarship. As 
our study illustrates, the questions of power, citizenship, difference and 
situated knowledge that the field prioritizes (Staeheli and Kofman, 2004) are 
innovatively augmented by an integrated socio-legal consideration of 
abortion regulations, distance, and rural women’s expertise and experiences.
Drawing on this literature as well as on the nascent field of critical rural 
studies (Fulkerson and Thomas, 2013), we additionally engage with and 
challenge the broader field of legal geography, offering a ruralist intervention
into an overwhelmingly metrocentric subdiscipline.  
Feminist Legal Theory and Abortion
Although the burden of travel was a prominent concern prior to the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade (Greenhouse and Siegel, 
2012), U.S. feminist legal scholars and litigators have generally not identified
distance, travel, or rurality as major issues in relation to abortion in the four 
decades since Roe.  In the intervening years, pro-choice advocates have 
invested considerable energy and resources in actually getting women to 
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abortion providers by funding for their travel (National Network of Abortion 
Funds, 2017), but pro-choice litigators have dedicated little attention to 
explaining or illustrating for courts the burden of distance.  In Casey, for 
example, the petitioners brief to the Supreme court made three mentions of 
“low-income, young, rural or battered women,” (Petitioners Brief Planned 
Parenthood of SE Pennsylvania v Casey 1992), but it did not, for example, 
detail the limits of public transportation in rural Pennsylvania nor discuss the 
price of bus tickets.  The briefs did not meaningfully illustrate the burden of 
distance to metro-centric judges who might not intuitively grasp the reality 
facing a low-income woman who lived a significant distance from a provider 
(Pruitt, 2007). This failure to attend to rurality and illustrate distance in a 
robust way no doubt reflects the difficult choices lawyers must make in 
appellate litigation, when strict page limits are imposed on legal briefs, and 
litigants face tough decisions regarding which issues and arguments to 
prioritize.8 
The relative lack of attention to rural women and distance in abortion 
litigation presumably also reflects the competing preoccupations of feminist 
legal scholars engaged with reproductive justice issues.  These scholars have
focused on issues such as the constitutional foundations for the right, the 
autonomy of women to choose termination of a pregnancy, and the practical 
8 Supreme Court Rule 33 2(b) limits the parties’ briefs to 40 pages and reply briefs to 15 
pages.  
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medical consequences of regulation (Siegel, 1992).  The U.S. abortion law 
literature has also taken up issues of sex inequality, constructions of gender, 
and evolving views of motherhood (Siegel, 1992).  While legal scholars do 
address the unevenness of abortion access, the disparities are typically 
presented as a function of age, race and/or poverty9 rather than in relation to
geography (Fried, 2000; Murray and Luker, 2014; Siegel, 1992; Sanger, 
2017; but see Pruitt 2007).  Indeed, the first U.S. textbook on reproductive 
rights and reproductive justice does not use the word “rural” a single time 
(Murray and Luker, 2014).  That the textbook mentions travel and distance, 
albeit in passing, is surely a function of the way pro-choice forces strategized
and presented their constitutional challenges to Texas H.B. 2.10  As we have 
already illustrated, Whole Woman’s Health brought distance to the 
foreground of their “undue burden” argument in a way different from any 
prior constitutional challenge to an abortion regulation.11
9 Interestingly, Mr. Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority of the Supreme Court in Roe v. 
Wade observed that “poverty, and racial overtones tend to complicate and not to simplify 
the problem.”  Roe, 1973: 116.  
10 In the span of nearly 1000 pages, the textbook authors observe only, in relation to early 
stages of the Texas H.B.2 litigation, that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was not convinced
that the increased travel distance from the Rio Grande Valley to abortion clinics up to 150 
miles away constituted an undue burden (Murray and Luker, 2014: 719).  
11 To be clear, the Whole Woman’s Health briefs in the Supreme Court litigation actually 
devoted relatively little attention to the matter of distance, but that must be understood in 
the context of the many issues that the petitioners had to address in order to win their case,
among them the lack of health benefits of H.B. 2 and the procedural issue of claim 
preclusion.  Further, petitioners to the Supreme Court are limited to a 40-page brief and a 
15-page reply brief.
The amicus curiae brief filed by the Public Health Deans, Department Chairs, and 
Faculty and the American Public Health Association. That brief described in great detail the 
transport options and accompanying costs for women traveling from different cities in Texas
to the remaining abortion providers, e.g., “[t]rips from Lubbock to Fort Worth by bus take 
roughly six to eight hours and cost from nearly $80 to $180 round-trip” and a flight would 
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This focus on distance in Whole Woman’s Health was compelled by the
operation of TRAP laws, which have proliferated dramatically since 2010 
(Guttmacher Institute, 2017).  Unlike prior abortion regulations that targeted 
women (e.g., by imposing waiting periods or consent requirements), TRAP 
regulations target abortion providers with the goal of putting them out of 
business.  This has proved a very successful strategy, as the implementation 
of Texas H.B. 2 illustrates.  Once the providers closed, the availability and 
spatial distribution of abortion services was so fundamentally altered that 
attention to increased travel burdens was virtually unavoidable.  
We use the opportunity presented by constitutional challenges to the 
Texas TRAP regulations to draw the obstacles of travel and distance back to 
the theoretical fore, as they were in the pre-Roe period.  In short, we trace 
the path of the pro-choice advocates in Whole Woman’s Health.  Feminist 
legal geography is a natural frame for engaging with these laws.    
Feminist Political Geography
A response to the marginalization of feminist perspectives in politics 
and political geography (Brown and Staehile, 2003; Staehile and Kofman, 
2004) and even geography more generally (Sharp, 2005), feminist legal 
geography has meaningfully moved critical attention from the macro level of 
cost $181.  (Public Health Deans et al. 2016: 35). The brief also documented the rates of 
carlessness, as well as poverty, in many cities that had lost abortion providers due to H.B.2. 
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political analysis to more complex engagements between private and public 
spheres; to diffuse, multifaceted and relational understandings of power and 
empowerment; to social and cultural citizenship; and to political geographies
that fluidly cut across gendered constructions of “formal” and “informal” 
(Staehile and Kofman, 2004; see also Brownill and Halford, 1990; Cope, 
2004; Secor, 2002). While influenced by all of these myriad contributions, we
build in particular on feminist political geography’s work on scale in tracing 
anti-abortion legislation across dimensions of scale that span the body 
(Marston, 2000; Nast, 1998) and extend to the national scale, here the 
highest court of a nation-state.  
We also attend to feminist geographers’ engagement with situated 
knowledge (Haraway, 1988; Hyndman, 2004).  In this context, situated 
knowledge refers to lived understandings of rural spatiality and distance, as 
well as to the varying degrees to which rural women’s experiences are 
recognized and understood at differing scales of the litigation process and 
mobilized elsewhere.  This article thus represents an opportunity for multi-
facted intervention, as rural geographers have historically appeared 
reluctant to embrace “feminist perspectives” (Little, 2002), and feminist 
political geography still largely prioritizes urban space and movements 
(Fenster, 2005; Nelson and Seager, 2008; Parker, 2011; Preston and 
Ustundag, 2008; Wekerle, 2004).
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Similarly, legal geographers—like legal scholars more generally—have 
rarely attended to the rural, particularly in the U.S. context (Pruitt, 2014).  It 
is unusual for scholars to recognize the localized operation of law in diverse 
rural places (cf. Havard, 2001; Turton, 2015; White, 2002; Pruitt and Colgan, 
2010) or to consider, let alone interrogate, the presumed co-constitutive 
relationship of law and rurality (Gillespie, 2014; Pruitt, 2014).  This 
urbanormativity means that the built environment (Braverman 2009; 
Clowney, 2013) attracts far more scholarly energy than the apparently 
“empty” spaces of the countryside (cf. Halfacree, 2006; Young, 2006), 
leaving rurality peripheral to the field’s lines of inquiry (Pruitt, 2014).  How 
legal geographers can meaningfully theorize and mobilize rural space, and 
specifically distance as a feature of rural life, remains a significant question, 
and it is one we address.
Consistent with the metrocentric orientation of the discipline, when 
legal geographers take up the study of rights, they tend to focus on the 
regulation of and competition for space, as reflected in Mitchell’s germinal 
The Right to the City (2003; see also Clowney, 2013; Blomley and Pratt, 
2001; Blomley, 2007, 2012; Braverman, 2009).  Legal geographers have also
grappled with rights in relation to mobility, but that work has also been 
limited to a particular array of rights, including the right to move goods 
(interstate commerce) and the right to travel, including immigration 
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(Creswell, 2006).  Meanwhile, feminist geographers have observed that 
many of these rights are male-centered (Massey,1993; see also Dowler and 
Sharp, 2001; Staeheli, 2001; Taylor, 2000). We extend this critique by 
analyzing a right that is unambiguously salient to women. 
The questions we address have practical import, too. In recent years, 
distance has been implicated repeatedly—albeit sometimes in ways the 
litigants did not surface or amplify—in laws restricting the exercise of two 
fundamental rights:  abortion and voting rights.12  This phenomenon 
suggests that it is not only scholars of legal geography who should be 
thinking about distance, but also lawmakers, lawyers, and judges.  With this 
paper, then, we aim to expand notions of what legal geography is “good for,”
to illustrate its utility across disciplines and professions (Delaney, 2015: 267-
68).
Recognizing the Legal Significance of “Empty” Land  
To understand the full import of rural distance, we turn to its apparent 
emptiness.  As demonstrated below, rural distance is at once material and 
12 One example of latent attention to spatiality is the Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford 
v. Marion County Election Board (2008), which upheld the requirement of a photo voter 
identification (ID) law.  In his dissent, Justice Souter discussed the lack of public 
transportation in many Indiana counties in relation to how voters would get to a public 
agency to secure a voter ID document, but he never talked about the burden of distance as 
such.  
Ironically, Texas legislation that pre-dates H.B. 2 similarly recognized the burden of 
distance in granting an exception to the state’s mandatory waiting period to women who 
live more than 100 miles from an abortion provider (Texas Health and Safety Code, 2011: 
§ 171.012 (b)(1)-(2). In other words, this legislation saved these women from making the two
trips to an abortion provider, though Casey found the two-trip requirement permissible.
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metaphorical: Wrapped up in it are powerful assumptions of vastness, 
im/mobility, and isolation.  Accordingly, the highway that spans and 
transects rural distance is both everything—“[brutalizing] the countryside 
and the land, slicing through space like a great knife,” (Lefebvre, 
1991[1974]: 165)—and nothing, the archetypal “non-place” (Augé, 1995). 
Drawing on Dalakoglou and Harvey (2012), we recognize the contested 
emptiness of this distance is powerfully indicative of more complex 
sociospatial and legal relationships. Indeed, while perhaps imagined as a 
“non-place” by a Supreme Court Justice or an urbanist legal geographer, 
rural distance proves “replete with social relations, with material histories, 
with regulatory forces… [and with] the simultaneity of global circulation and 
local lifeworlds of (im)mobility, speed, motion, friction, tensions and journey”
(Dalakoglou and Harvey, 2012: 463). 
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The obscured fullness of this emptiness also complicates prevailing 
narratives of rural distance.  It allows for the simultaneity of isolation as a 
disadvantage (Monk, 2000; Pruitt, 2014; Stratfford, 2006; Young, 2006) and 
a resource (Royle, 2007; Sherman, 2015; Pruitt 2008a), and for immobility to
connote defeat, failure, or being left behind (Morley, 2000; Pruitt, 2011; 
Creswell, 2006), as well as selected and practiced forms of insulation 
(Vannini, 2011).  In relation to abortion access, these complex rural realities 
have been varyingly characterized as extra-legal (Johnstone, 2014; Sethna et
al., 2013) or as legally and administratively prescribed (Ackerman, 2015).  In 
this way, the “empty place” becomes a repository of relationships and 
networks (Pruitt 2008a; Young 2006), with distance proving relational-
material and epistemic (Kaljonen, 2006).  Consequently, recognizing “empty”
distance as both socially and legally constructed (Pruitt, 2014) and 
agentively traversed (cf. Burkstrand-Reid, 2010; Pruitt, 2007, 2008a, 2008b) 
is necessary to comprehend a more latent reciprocity, namely that of place-
based knowledge (Bartel et al., 2013: 349) and of being legally “known.”
Bridging Distance: Visibility, Empathy, and Justice 
Catharine MacKinnon famously quipped that, for women, “law is high 
up, and a long way off” (2005: 35), and Pruitt elsewhere suggests the same 
is true for rural people and places (Pruitt, 2014).  Following this, material and
social distance magnify the syllogism: legal protections are especially 
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removed from women in rural places (Pruitt 2007, 2008b).  This also 
underscores rural women’s intersectional invisibility (Purdie-Vaughns and 
Eibach, 2008) in the context of anti-abortion legislation (Pruitt, 2007; Pruitt 
and Vanegas, 2015).  As much of the non-legal scholarship on abortion 
access indicates (Colman and Joyce, 2011; Lichter et al., 1998; McTavish, 
2015; Palmer, 2011; Sethna, 2006), it is often the distance between a 
woman’s community and an abortion provider—and how this distance is/not 
traversed—that powerfully illuminates the otherwise invisible experiences of 
marginal members within marginalized groups.  That this distance may 
include an internal immigration checkpoint (Grossman et al., 2010; 
Huddleston, 2016), for example, for women living in South Texas, demands 
necessary acknowledgment of the intersecting identities of women, including
those who are undocumented, low-income Latinas living in colonias (informal
settlements) in the Rio Grande Valley (Gomez, 2015). 
Distance also reveals other largely “invisible” realities:  the particular 
spatial and social inaccessibility of sexual and reproductive health services 
for many rural women, especially young ones13 (Jewell and Brown, 2000; 
Sethna and Doull, 2007; Pruitt, 2007; Hodgson v. Minnesota, 1990; Jane’s 
Due Process, 2017); the financial and bureaucratic burdens Native American 
13 In Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) Justice Marshall, concurring in part and 
dissenting in part, wrote:  “The burden of such travel, often requiring an overnight stay in a 
distance city, is particularly heavy for poor women from rural areas.  Furthermore, a young 
woman’s absence from home, school or work during this time required for travel and for the 
hearing itself can jeopardize the woman’s confidentiality.”  Id. at 476.  
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women may face in accessing an abortion, particularly if it includes travel 
beyond a remote community or reservation (NAACP, 1992: 22; Sethna and 
Doull, 2013; Pruitt and Vanegas, 2015); and the socio-legal advantages and 
vulnerabilities implicit in driving and carlessness (Pruitt 2007, 2008b; Sanger,
1995).  
As noted earlier, the Whole Woman’s Health litigation implicates not 
only distance, but also im/mobility and assumptions about it. Creswell 
asserts, “law is one very important site in which mobilities are produced” 
(2006: 735), and indeed, for decades, most courts have assumed that 
women enjoy sufficient mobility to get to an abortion provider—if they want 
an abortion badly enough (Burkstrand-Reid, 2010; Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 1992; Pruitt, 2007; Pruitt and Vanegas, 
2015).  Whole Woman’s Health soundly rebuts that notion, taking seriously 
distance as a barrier, along with the struggle for actual, physical mobility 
from one place to another, a struggle that significant numbers of women 
face.   
We consider these socio-spatial and legal realities initially at the scale 
of the body (Massey, 1993; Marston, 2000), which demands a simultaneous 
recognition of law as both embodied (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 2014: 55; 
Pruitt, 2008a; Siegel, 1992) and emplaced, i.e., as determining when and 
how much distance is legally salient.  Acknowledging the lived quality of a 
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legally imposed distance does more than render visible so many intersecting 
invisibilities:  it arguably induces a more just and empathic recognition of 
both structural interpellation and a woman’s individual agency (Little, 2016: 
3) in the context of restricted access to abortion services.  
As Michael Crozier (1999: 626) notes, travelling long distances 
inherently challenges abstract theoretical conceptions of space as “infinitely 
minute”: “The [traveler]… (body aching, head throbbing) would beg to 
differ…” Most of us know this feeling, whether sustained from a long 
commute on public transit, a road trip, or a red-eye flight.  We need not cross
the “abortion desert” (Hennessy-Fiske, 2016)—contiguous clusters of U.S. 
states with restrictive laws and dwindling numbers of clinics—in order to 
identify with those who have.  We might be able to imagine the sometimes 
punishing nature of distance and, in light of the aforementioned 
“invisibilities,” the urgency and intrepidness of those who traverse such 
unfamiliar yet consequential terrain (see e.g. Greenhouse, 2016; Hennessy-
Fiske, 2016; Sethna and Doull, 2013).  
As one attorney Statz interviewed described, even the simulated trip 
between the Rio Grande Valley to an abortion provider and back is taxing: 
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Rewire [then RH Check (Grimes 2014)] had a couple of their 
correspondents do a road trip… They drove from McAllen to San 
Antonio and back [filming the drive]. And one day when I was 
working I had it on, like the background on my screen. It was all 
day. And they didn’t have an appointment—they didn’t have an 
abortion in the interim, they just drove there and drove back.  
And it felt like a very grueling experience, [even] just watching 
that. 
As we further demonstrate below, when considered, experienced, or even 
virtually traversed, an expanse of rural distance is at once a bridge, 
connecting a profoundly felt reality to largely invisible sociolegal and spatial 
vulnerabilities and to opportunities for mobilization. 
Making Distance Legally Cognizable in Whole Women’s Health v. 
Hellerstedt
As noted in our overview above, the plaintiffs in Whole Woman’s 
Health presented evidence to substantiate and illustrate the burden of 
distance, including both quantitative and qualitative testimony.  Dr. Dan 
Grossman, a public health scholar, contributed the former, which consisted 
of projections about the increased travel distances facing women (see also 
Gerdts et al., 2016).  He testified, for example, about the consequences of 
the admitting privileges requirement:
Between November 1, 2012 and May 1, 2014,” that is, 
before and after enforcement of the admitting-privileges 
requirement, “the decrease in geographical distribution of 
abortion facilities” has meant that the number of women of 
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reproductive age living more than 50 miles from a clinic has 
doubled (from 800,000 to over 1.6 million); those living more 
than 100 miles has increased by 150% (from 400,000 to 1 
million); those living more than 150 miles has increased by more 
than 350% (from 86,000 to 400,000); and those living more than 
200 miles has increased by about 2,800% (from 10,000 to 
290,000).  (Joint Appendix: 238-242 quoted in Whole Woman’s 
Health, 2016: 2302)
Grossman also projected in similar, quantitative terms the consequences of 
upholding the ASC.
Lucila “Lucy” Felix, state health educator, or promotora, provided what
might be seen as qualitative testimony about the burden facing women in 
the RGV.  Felix was a key source of local, place-based knowledge, testifying 
at trial about the socioeconomic deprivation of the Rio Grande Valley and the
struggle there for access to health care, including reproductive health care.14
She also spoke specifically to the impact of increased travel distances 
caused by the closure of all RGV clinics15:     
[T]he availability of transportation decreases and the cost of 
transportation increases with the length of the journey.  An 
increase of over 470 miles round-trip is incredibly significant for 
14 In her other role as Senior Texas Field Coordinator for the National Latina Institute for 
Reproductive Health (NLIRH), Felix helped to lead Nuestro Texas (Our Texas), a campaign by
the Center for Reproductive Rights and NLIRH that collected individual stories from RGV 
women to develop policy reports documenting the impacts of state funding cuts to family 
planning services in the region.  http://www.nuestrotexas.org/pdf/NT-spread.pdf
15 It is not customary in U.S. abortion litigation for women seeking abortions to be named 
plaintiffs who set forth the details of their own lives in relation to the undue burden 
standard.  (Whole Women’s Health, 2016: 2322; cf. Hodgson).Thus, in a sense, Lucy Felix 
served as a proxy for the burdened women, speaking for them.  Indeed, the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals referred to her testimony as hearsay.  (Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 
2015: 593 n.39).
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a woman in the Rio Grande Valley.  There is no public 
transportation that goes between the Rio Grande Valley and San
Antonio, and it is over a 3.5 hour drive each way.  That amounts 
to a minimum of 7 hours of travel time. Gasoline costs are 
significantly higher than if a woman only had to travel within the
Rio Grande Valley, and it is harder for a woman without a car to 
find someone willing and able to drive her.  (If a woman were 
going to a clinic in McAllen, a friend or neighbor could drop her 
off, return home, and then pick her up when she was done. But 
San Antonio is too far away for that.  The driver must commit to 
accompanying her for the whole day.) 
Felix also noted the added costs of abortion for women who already had 
children, who must either find child care or take their children with them, 
thereby incurring additional costs and delays for “eating, napping, and/or 
bathroom breaks” (Joint Appendix, Vol. I, Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole (No.
15-274) 2015: 358-70).      
Mentioned often and with clear appreciation by the attorneys Statz 
interviewed, Felix’s work and testimony powerfully illuminates the 
intersectional invisibility of women of the Rio Grande Valley.  One attorney, 
Naomi, reflected, “[Lucy] showed… that this legislation will have concrete 
and substantial consequences in the lives of women who are 
disproportionally affected because of their poverty.  These are also women of
color, and they also face risk and vulnerability in other ways, because of their
immigration status, because there’s no transportation—a combination of all 
of these factors which makes it impossible for them to access healthcare.” At
once acknowledging these structural inequalities as well as the agentive 
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power of women (Little, 2016) in the Rio Grande Valley, Naomi added:
You have communities still off the grid—colonias—right? 
[They’re] building their own housing, trying to find access to their
own electricity and water sources, their own transportation… it 
[is] such extreme resilience in the face of an absolute disinterest 
on the part of so many people, including the government... The 
level of deep poverty, of poverty of children, and the healthcare 
crisis and the juxtaposition of all of these issues [with] a lack of 
dignified housing, lack of dignified work… So to hear some of 
these stories [through Lucy], to see how in every facet of their 
lives they were really tried to be made invisible—and yet… these
women were really finding their voice as a community on an 
issue that could be politically ostracizing, and were willing to use 
whatever, if any, political power—we want to talk about our 
healthcare, our bodies—to reframe this issue as a healthcare 
crisis… The way that they were organizing, their willingness to 
step out of the shadow that was engulfing them in so many 
ways…. 
Here Naomi implicitly challenged a polarized interpretation of isolation—as a 
failure or a choice, a disadvantage or a resource—by recognizing 
mobilization amidst immobility. 
Illuminating the complex realities navigated by women in isolated and 
arguably “forgotten” colonias (Rivera, 2014), Lucy Felix’s testimony “came 
across as very powerful and as very hard to ignore,” stated Tom, another 
attorney.  “You know… if you never have to travel to the Rio Grande Valley, 
you can ignore the reality of these women. So bringing Lucy in to testify…her
willingness to step up to that and literally speak truth to power…had a very 
moving effect.” 
Yet in spite of the “moving effect” that Tom observed, among the 
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courts adjudicating whether Texas H.B.2 was an undue burden—including 
the federal district court judge who heard Felix’s testimony first hand—only 
one court referred directly to her testimony.  The Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals mentioned Felix’s testimony, but it did not credit the testimony as 
establishing an undue burden; indeed, the court dismissed her testimony by 
characterizing it as secondhand or hearsay. (Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 
2015: 593 n.39).  As with the Grossman testimony, the plaintiffs presented 
the Felix testimony to the Supreme Court as part of the Joint Appendix, which
collected all the filings and transcripts since the case was filed in district 
court, but the Court did not mention the Felix testimony in the oral argument
or in its opinion.  
The failure to acknowledge Felix’s testimony was in sharp contrast to 
the Court’s attitude toward Dr. Grossman’s quantitative data, which the 
plaintiffs also had not mentioned in their briefs.  During oral argument, the 
U.S. Supreme Court Justices engaged the parties’ lawyers in five distinct 
exchanges about Dr. Grossman’s data.  The Court’s opinion also extensively 
quoted and cited Grossman’s testimony regarding the numbers of women 
facing increased travel distances to abortion providers due to H.B.2.16  The 
Court thus exhibited a professional bias in favor of the public health scholar’s
quantitative testimony, perhaps a consequence of its being so far-removed 
16 Dr. Grossman’s testimony was disputed by an expert witness testifying on behalf of the 
State of Texas.  The Court found Dr. Grossman’s testimony to be the more credible of the 
two and relied on it. (Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 2016: 2316-17).
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from the RGV or because of Dr. Grossman’s more recognizably “elite” 
credentials.  
Thus the quantification of distance proved crucial in the Whole 
Woman’s Health litigation. Attorneys varyingly described the numerical data 
as important and clear contributions to the factual record, or as a way to add
necessary specificity or concreteness to the “undue burden” standard.  One 
attorney viewed the quantification of distance as an appeal to presumptively 
urban-centric judges (Fulkerson and Thomas, 2013; Pruitt and Vanegas, 
2015): “You know, the fact that women in El Paso would’ve had to drive 550 
miles to the nearest Texas clinic,” commented Tom, “I think that just 
resonates with people.  It doesn’t require too much of a mental leap to 
realize how difficult that is.”17  Sitting in his Manhattan office, another 
attorney highlighted this “mental leap” in relation to judges and attorneys: 
“The Supreme Court—they come from different cultural backgrounds, and 
they’ve lived in, you know, major metropolitan areas and maybe don’t have 
the same connection [to rurality]… I don’t want to paint with a broad brush, 
but you’re somewhat far-removed from that. I’m sort of far-removed from 
that, right?” 
Another attorney who worked on the case commented: “I understand 
why the state defaulted to the quantification of distance, and why it was 
17 Yet the Fifth Circuit in Abbott, the predecessor to Whole Woman’s Health, expressed 
skepticism about the burden of traveling between the RGV and Corpus Christi.  Oral 
argument in Planned Parenthood v. Abbott (2014).
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such a focus.” She hesitated and then added, “But it only tells a small piece 
of the story, that’s for sure… You know, it could still be difficult if it’s 30 
miles.” A colleague similarly mentioned those women who live along the 
U.S.-Mexico border and have visas permitting them to travel lawfully only a 
certain number of miles within the U.S.18  “So again,” she said, “with the 
closure of clinics on the border, those miles take on added weight, added 
meaning. It’s not just a question of distance.” Still another observed:
Part of our evidence went to trying to demonstrate that 
while the law is going to impose burdens on women throughout 
Texas, women will experience those burdens in different ways. 
So… for women who are in rural communities where there’s not 
a clinic nearby, now they’re going to have to deal with longer 
travel and traveling outside of the region that they’re familiar 
with and comfortable with. That in and of itself can be a huge 
burden for people and a big deterrence for someone that doesn’t
often go to the big city, having to go to San Antonio can be very 
foreboding, and particularly if it’s someone who’s younger, who’s
traveling on their own, who’s been told all their life that it’s 
dangerous to go to the city… There are these sort of 
psychological burdens that come with having to make that trip, 
and just go somewhere that’s unfamiliar. 
The lawyer, speaking with the benefit of hindsight two months after 
the Supreme Court decision, echoed language the federal district court had 
used in its findings of fact about the undue burden: “inarticulable 
psychological obstacles.”  That court had elaborated on the burden as a 
composite of many burdens, its weight necessarily varying from woman to 
18 This distance is specifically to a border checkpoint 73 miles north of McAllen, in Falfurrias, 
en route to Corpus Christi or San Antonio (Huddleston 2016).  
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woman:
[T]he record conclusively establishes that increased travel 
distances combine with practical concerns unique to every 
woman. These practical concerns include lack of availability of 
child care, unreliability of transportation, unavailability of 
appointments at abortion facilities, unavailability of time off 
work, immigration status and inability to pass border 
checkpoints, poverty level, the time and expense involved in 
traveling long distances, and other, inarticulable psychological 
obstacles.  These factors combine with increased travel distances
to establish a de facto barrier to obtaining an abortion for a large
number of Texas women who might choose to seek a legal 
abortion.  (Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 2014: 683)
Even though the federal district court did not link these finding to Felix, that 
court’s language seems to channel Felix’s testimony in all of its texture, 
depicting the complex challenges facing women who live in one of the 
poorest places in the United States, women who are also marginalized by 
their ethnicity and, in some cases, their immigration status.   
By the time the case had reached the Supreme Court, however, this 
complexity was reduced to a recognition of the “particularly high barrier” the
law presented for “poor, rural, or disadvantaged women,” (Whole Woman’s 
Health, 2016: 2302) a more succinct finding of the trial court.19  Yet these 
three descriptors—poor, rural, disadvantaged—may be seen as an opaque 
reference to the particular travails of women in the Rio Grande Valley.  These
descriptors arguably refer to the region’s Latinas, a begrudging 
19 In the interim, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reiterated this finding of 
fact by the federal district court, even as it drew a different legal conclusion 
regarding the “undue burden” question.  
35
© Michele Statz & Lisa R. Pruitt 2017
Working Paper 
August 14, 2017
 
acknowledgment of those whom Naomi had characterized as “invisible.”   
Finally, it is important to note that the Supreme Court in Whole 
Woman’s Health simultaneously touted and limited the significance of 
distance.  As an apparent caveat to its conclusion regarding that burden, the 
Court added that “increased driving distances do not always constitute an 
‘undue burden.’”  (Whole Woman’s Health, 2016: 2313).  The Court wrote, 
“those increases are but one additional burden, which, when taken together 
with others that the closings brought about, and when viewed in light of the 
virtual absence of any health benefit, lead us to conclude that the record 
adequately supports the District Court’s ‘undue burden’ conclusion.”  (Whole 
Woman’s Health, 2016: 2313).  The Supreme Court’s downplaying of 
distance in this way may have been aimed at doing more than giving due 
attention to other consequences of the clinic closures, e.g., fewer doctors 
and longer waiting times.  The articulated limitation regarding distance is 
likely also attributable to respect for precedent—specifically the Casey 
finding that multiple trips to a provider, the practical consequence of the 
challenged waiting period—did not constitute an undue burden, even as 
those trips implicated distance, along with the added costs of time and 
money required to traverse it.    
Conclusion: Why this Matters 
Whole Woman’s Health is the first case to put distance squarely before
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the U.S. Supreme Court for a determination regarding its significance as a 
burden on a woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy.  The Supreme Court 
adopted some of the characterizations and conclusions of the trial court 
regarding the nature of the burden, including the express mention of “poor, 
rural or disadvantaged women.”  In this brief phrase, rural distance emerged 
as compelling.  Of equal or greater significance, though, was the Court’s 
recitation of quantitative data regarding how many women were situated 
how far from abortion providers as a result of the new regulations. 
These Supreme Court findings are revealing not only in relation to the 
judicial cognizance of distance, but also from the perspective of feminist 
legal geography’s understanding of knowledge and power.  While the 
situated knowledge of Lucy Felix had a powerful influence on the plaintiffs’ 
attorneys, it was the quantitative data put forth by Dan Grossman that the 
Court prioritized.  Indeed, Grossman’s testimony effectively eclipsed Felix’s 
more qualitative understanding of the burden of distance as it intersected 
with other factors. By tracing what kinds of spatial narratives, whose 
expertise, and what types of data about distance influence legal outcomes—
which in turn dictate the terms on which women live their lives—Whole 
Woman’s Health invites a rethinking of rurality, gendered and elite 
knowledge, and judicial blind spots. 
This attention to distance in Whole Woman’s Health illustrates how 
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that which is often portrayed as “empty” land—whether devoid of the built 
environment and life more generally or of abortion providers more 
specifically—becomes a legal framing of its traversal, powerfully imbued with
significance.  “Landscapes are in many ways legal performances, with law 
acting as a fusing agent between place and identity” (Howe, 2008).  The 
Supreme Court’s acknowledgement of the legal salience of sheer, vast, 
material space—of distance—fused space and identity, the identity of being 
rural.  Its implicit recognition of Latinas in the Rio Grande Valley can likewise 
be said to fuse place and identity.  
As it regards the recognition of rural vulnerability in relation to the 
exercise of rights, Whole Woman’s Health represents both a positive and a 
negative shift.  On the one hand, because Texas is the second largest U.S. 
state in terms of land area, it presents an extraordinary case of distance as 
burden. (Only within the State of Alaska might one have to travel farther to 
reach an abortion provider).  Plaintiffs were arguably wise to take to the 
Supreme Court this case rather than a challenge to similar legislation in a 
state covering less land area.  At the same time, that the Texas case 
implicated such enormous distances does not necessarily bode well for 
litigation of similar issues in smaller states, where the distances to be 
traversed are not so great. 
In terms of other fundamental rights and the impact of Whole Woman’s
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Health outside the abortion context, we note that our exploration of distance 
raises a compelling parallel between abortion litigation and litigation 
regarding the right to vote.  At least one federal district court has recognized
that voter identification (ID) laws requiring travel to a public agency to obtain
the requisite voter ID card/document are an “undue burden” on the right to 
vote (Texas v. Holder, 2014).  While that finding was reversed on appeal, 
Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissenting from the Supreme 
Court decision not to review the case, invoked the burden of distance in 
terms that foreshadowed Whole Woman’s Health.  Justice Ginsburg observed
that “more than 400,000 eligible voters face round-trip travel times of three 
hours or more to the nearest [ID issuing] office” (Veasey v. Perry, 2014: 11). 
Thus the articulation of the burden of distance in Whole Woman’s Health 
may thus soon find ready application elsewhere, as a new wave of voter ID 
litigation is anticipated during the Trump presidency. 
We have demonstrated that the legal and political recognition of 
distance is anything but straightforward, revealing and often reaffirming 
feminist understandings of knowledge and knowledge claims—in this case 
the partiality of whose “version” of distance matters, and when—and 
implicating “invisible” realities of gender, poverty and immigration status.  
By tracing how the courts who heard Whole Woman’s Health grappled with 
distance as, at once, “emptiness” and im/mobility, lived and embodied, and 
39
© Michele Statz & Lisa R. Pruitt 2017
Working Paper 
August 14, 2017
 
qualitatively and quantitatively narrated, this article draws us closer to a 
more nuanced understanding of rural spatiality. By knitting together critical 
insights from feminist political geography, legal geography, and feminist 
legal theory, we have demonstrated that socio-legal scholarship on 
reproductive justice, spatiality, and rights needs a critical rural dimension. 
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